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ABSTRACT 
Yemen’s most recent civil war began in 2015 and has affected nearly every 
person in the country. In addition to war and violence, Yemen has historically 
experienced a wide array of environmental insecurities, including water scarcity, famine, 
and migration precipitated by these factors. This thesis examines how environmental 
insecurities have affected the ongoing civil war and whether they have been used as a 
tool in the war. Also, this thesis asks whether these issues existed before the war or 
emerged as a by-product of the war. The thesis discovers that although environmental 
insecurities pre-dated the war, they were not a primary cause of the war’s onset. Military 
forces have intermittently exploited environmental insecurities to their benefit during the 
war; however. not enough evidence exists at this time to prove insecurities like 
water scarcity have been used as a tool of war. The war has indeed exacerbated 
environmental insecurities to deteriorate due to destruction of water infrastructure, 
blockage of seaports, and internally displaced persons migrating to urban centers. 
Without an end to the fighting, issues like water scarcity, famine, disease, and 
migration will continue to worsen. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
The extreme humanitarian suffering in Yemen due to water scarcity, famine, and 
migration currently threatens to increase instability in Yemen and the rest of the Middle 
East. To achieve a stable solution to the crisis, this thesis delineates how the civil conflict 
arose in relation to the environmental insecurities that already existed in the country. It 
examines the following question: How have environmental insecurities affected the 
ongoing conflict in Yemen? More specifically, did environmental insecurities exist before 
the war, were they a by-product of the war, and/or were they a tool used in the war? This 
inquiry explains how environmental insecurity issues arose and whether or not they are 
exacerbating the plight of the people facing the civil war.  
In addressing the topic, the research explores whether Yemen can solve these issues 
on its own and, if not, what assistance is needed to help Yemen recover and create a 
prosperous nation. This analysis also assesses whether solving the environmental 
insecurity issues is a viable means of stemming the conflict and what the United States and 
other leading nations in the world can do to find a solution. 
Unfortunately, Yemen is not a key foreign policy issue for the United States, nor is 
it an important resource for the rest of the world.1 In other words, the crisis in Yemen is 
not one that is known throughout the globe. Edwards and Cromwell go to great lengths to 
expose how the media has failed to do its duty by accurately and forcefully reporting on 
atrocities in the country.2 Helen Lackner alludes to the killing of Saudi journalist, Jamal 
Khashoggi, as the only reason the United States and other Western countries became aware 
of the crisis in Yemen.3 An increase in media coverage on Yemen has led to higher global 
1 Jeremy M Sharp and Christopher M Blanchard, “Yemen: Peace Talks and Current Congressional 
Action,” CRS (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 10, 2018), 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11006. 
2 David Edwards and David Cromwell, “Yemen: Feeding the Famine,” in Propaganda Blitz: How the 
Corporate Media Distort Reality (London: Pluto Press, 2018), 125–41, https://www.jstor.org/stable/
j.ctv69tg4v.
3 Helen Lackner, Yemen in Crisis: The Road to War, U.S. edition (London ; New York: Verso, 2019), 
xxvii.
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awareness and challenges being made by the U.S. House of Representatives on arms sales 
to Saudi Arabia. More public knowledge of the environmental insecurities may promote 
foreign governments to take action. 
The Republic of Yemen’s (ROY) government is to blame for many of the 
environmental insecurities prevailing throughout the country. The ROY is the result of the 
union between the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) in the North and the People’s Democratic 
Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in the South in the 1990s. Looney points to the lack of internal 
policy reforms as the cause of poor economic performance for many Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) countries, including Yemen.4 Although the transition years appeared 
hopeful from 1992–1994, the country struggled to become a fully functioning economy 
under Yemen’s former and first president, Ali Abdullah Saleh. Understanding the 
economic and political struggles of the ROY is imperative in order to grasp why its 
environmental insecurity issues have continued to grow. 
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Environmental security can serve as a catalyst for conflict or reconciliation. People 
need food, shelter, and basic amenities like water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) to 
survive.5 If people are withheld any of these items, then, most likely, a population will do 
anything in their power to secure them. Therefore, people have two options: fight for their 
lives to obtain those items or reconcile with others in order to find a peaceful solution 
together, possibly one the society could not achieve on their own. The humanitarian crisis 
in Yemen has real world implications for the stability in the country. In Syria, ISIS was 
able to convince starving people to give them willing family members to conduct suicide 
raids.6 In return, ISIS offered protection and food to those families. Because the families 
 
4 Robert Looney, “Why Has the Middle East Been so Slow to Globalize?,” Review of Middle East 
Economics and Finance 3, no. 3 (December 2005): 173–202, https://doi.org/10.1080/14753680500407043. 
5 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR WASH Manual: Practical Guidance for 
Refugee Settings - UNHCR WASH Programme Guidance,” Program Manual (Geneva: UNHCR, January 
2020). 
6 Nadim Houry, “Children of the Caliphate,” November 22, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/levant/2016-11-22/children-caliphate. 
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were in extreme need of main essentials, they were more than willing to accept this bargain. 
Such a situation could be easily replicated in Yemen.  
This thesis brings to light the history and suffering of the people in Yemen through 
the lens of environmental security issues. In doing so, humanitarian assistance will be 
explored in how it plays a significant role in the United States’ foreign affairs and acts as 
a vital function of the U.S. military. Yemen is unique because, in some regards, the U.S. 
inadvertently contributed to events that opposed the goals of humanitarianism. Because 
America provided arms sales to Saudi Arabia and mid-air refueling capabilities for Saudi 
fighter jets, America may hold a share of the responsibility for the conflict, and for finding 
a peaceful solution.7 As this thesis explains, the solution to ending the conflict will not be 
found by rectifying environmental insecurities in the region. Arguably, the suffering of 
millions of people and an outbreak of another civil war in Yemen was avoidable if, in 2010, 
the ROY government had addressed the country’s plethora of political, economic, social, 
and security problems.8  
Yemen suffers from a plethora of environmental issues. The country is in dire straits 
with regards to water, food production, infrastructure, migration, and terrorism. All of these 
have increased since the outbreak of the country’s third civil war in 2015. Ashok Swain 
declares, “Water can be an impetus for war or an impetus for peace.”9 In the case of Yemen, 
it appears to be an impetus for war. The country is heavily dependent on agricultures even 
though less than 2.6% of its land is arable, causing negative effects on water and food 
production.10 Migration continues to place a strain on water sources in urban areas as rural 
areas begin to run dry. Additionally, Yemen has been a safe haven for terrorist groups over 
 
7 Rick Rowley, Kingdom of Silence (Jigsaw Productions, 2020), pt. 53:17, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=T5MlpQgwHY0. 
8 Ibrahim Galal Fakirah, “Yemen Conflict,” Middle East Institute (MEI), no. Yemen and Gulf Program 
(October 2020): 4. 
9 Ashok Swain, Managing Water Conflict: Asia, Africa and the Middle East (London: Taylor and 
Francis, 2004), 33, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203502969. 
10 Milen Dyoulgerov, Ana Bucher, and Fernanda Zermoglio, “Vulnerability, Risk Reduction, and 
Adaption to Climate Change: Yemen,” Climate Risk and Adaptation Country Profile (The World Bank 
Group, April 2011), 2. 
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the past half century.11 Yemen and other countries continue to argue about the definition 
of water scarcity rather than the root causes and do not give water the platform it arguably 
deserves.12 If governments and more importantly, humans, do not learn that fighting rebel 
factions and assassinating their leaders is not the answer to ending the environmental 
insecurities, then water scarcity can seriously hinder a country from developing.  
The conflict in Yemen reverberates across the world, albeit behind the scenes. The 
clash in Yemen afflicts Washington’s ability to maintain peace in the region and ensure the 
safe passage of oil and other energy exports within the surrounding waters.13 The 
catastrophically poor situation in five countries in the region suggests that the United States 
and other countries interested in the security of the region may need to re-evaluate possible 
solutions to ending the conflict.14 Saudi Arabia plays a pivotal role in this war; for decades, 
the KSA has continued to back the losing side of any turmoil in Yemen.15 The importance 
of these interactions will be further developed in chapter two and will delineate how Saudi 
Arabia plays a crucial part in affecting environmental security issues within the ROY. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Many examples stress how water insecurity, famine, migration, and other 
environmental insecurity issues have threatened Yemen over time. Nonetheless, research 
on how environmental insecurity issues have affected the civil war in Yemen are lacking 
in a substantial regard. Available literature points to an overwhelming number of responses 
that do not necessarily believe environmental insecurities can start a war; however, 
literature on other countries indicates that such insecurities can be used as a weapon and 
 
11 Aaron Edwards, “Yemen: Civil War and Humanitarian Catastrophe,” Political Insight 10, no. 2 
(June 2019): 15, https://doi.org/10.1177/2041905819854310. 
12 Nicholas S. Robins and James Fergusson, “Groundwater Scarcity and Conflict – Managing 
Hotspots,” Earth Perspectives 1, no. 1 (February 2014): 2,6, https://doi.org/10.1186/2194-6434-1-6. 
13 Stephen A. Cook, “No Exit: Why the Middle East Still Matters to America,” Foreign Affairs 99, no. 
6 (December 2020): 140. 
14 Cook, 133. 
15 Bruce Riedel, “Saudi Arabia and the Civil War Within Yemen’s Civil War,” The Brookings 
Institution, Order from Chaos (blog) (Washington, August 15, 2019), https://search-proquest-
com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/2273530465?rfr_id=info%3Axri%2Fsid%3Aprimo. 
5 
prolong a conflict. This literature review will examine whether conflict arises from issues 
like water scarcity along with the development of environmental insecurities in Yemen. 
1. Broad Environmental Security Issues  
Many authors argue that a decrease in the water supply can provoke armed 
conflicts. Ashok Swain illustrates this phenomenon with the argument map depicted in 
Figure 1, which shows how environmental insecurity issues can lead to conflict. Many of 
the factors in this map are relevant in the Yemen case. Urbanization and agricultural growth 
have increased due to the explosion in population growth in Yemen. These two factors 
increased the need for water. Meanwhile, a lack of government infrastructure and growth 
in subsistence farming have led to conflicts and destruction of water sources. 
  
Figure 1. Increasing Demand Over Water and Creation of Conflicting 
Actors16 
Scholars debate whether water scarcity can provoke armed conflicts. Cooley 
provides an example of traditional “water war” narratives; he argues that wars have been 
caused over water and points directly to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and other water conflicts 
between Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine as proof.17 The Pacific Institute has identified more 
 
16 Source: Swain, Managing Water Conflict, 20. 
17 John K. Cooley, “The War Over Water,” Foreign Policy, no. 54 (April 1984): 3, https://doi.org/
10.2307/1148352. 
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than 4500 water-related conflicts from around the world.18 Gleick, the institute’s director, 
attributes many of the conflicts surrounding water supply to the lack of international 
humanitarian law and the reduced ability of a global agency to effectively persecute those 
who violate the laws in place.19 King argues that water scarcity causes conflicts and 
instability in regions like Syria in 2011.20 The authors also point to the use of water as a 
weapon in a conflict and directly show how opposing sides will make positive gains by 
causing the civilians in the region to suffer.21 
However, other authors have challenged the idea that water causes armed conflict. 
Meierding explains even though many researchers have propositioned that climate change 
and conflicts will arise, she questions the validity of these studies due to the complexity of 
the relationships the scientists examine.22 Wolf states, “War over water seems neither 
strategically rational, hydrographically effective, nor economically viable.”23 Edwards 
asserts that a lack of medicine and access to clean water and food directly attributes to the 
war rather than a fight over water itself.24 Alam argues that “war over water is the 
exception” whereas cooperation and water sharing among nations and within nations is the 
undisputable norm.25 The debate over water wars continues and will increase as the earth 
consistently warms. 
 
18 Water Conflict Chronology, Water Conflict Chronology Database (Pacific Institute), accessed 
November 10, 2020, http://www.worldwater.org/conflict/map/. 
19 Peter H. Gleick, “Water as a Weapon and Casualty of Conflict: Freshwater and International 
Humanitarian Law,” Water Resources Management 33, no. 5 (February 2019): 1738, https://doi.org/
10.1007/s11269-019-02212-z. 
20 Marcus DuBois King, “The Weaponization of Water in Syria and Iraq,” The Washington Quarterly 
38, no. 4 (October 2015): 155, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2015.1125835. 
21 King, 153–69; Peter H. Gleick, “Water as a Weapon and Casualty of Armed Conflict: A Review of 
Recent Water‐Related Violence in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen,” Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Water 6, no. 
4 (April 2019): 15, https://doi.org/10.1002/wat2.1351; Cooley, “The War Over Water,” 3. 
22 Emily Meierding, “Climate Change and Conflict: Avoiding Small Talk about the Weather,” 
International Studies Review 15, no. 2 (2013): 185–203, https://doi.org/10.1111/misr.12030. 
23 Aaron T. Wolf, “Conflict and Cooperation Along International Waterways,” Water Policy I (June 
30, 1998): 251. 
24 Edwards and Cromwell, “Yemen,” 128. 
25 Undala Z. Alam, “Questioning the Water Wars Rationale: A Case Study of the Indus Waters 
Treaty,” The Geographical Journal 168, no. 4 (December 2002): 347, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0016-
7398.2002.00060.x. 
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2. Environmental Security Issues Pertaining to Yemen 
Several scholars have affirmed the environmental insecurities that exist in Yemen 
today are due to the overextraction of ground water for agricultural use.26 Lackner states, 
“As agriculture is estimated to use close to 90% of Yemen’s water, and 70% of the 
country’s population live in rural areas, it is essential to develop sustainable water 
management policies if Yemenis are to continue living in the country’s urban and rural 
areas.”27 From 1962 onward, the governments in both YAR and PDRY failed to create a 
water infrastructure suitable for farming. Farmers dug wells whenever and however they 
desired, causing the groundwater supply to diminish much faster than experts predicted.28 
The inability of the government to regulate had a direct effect on all other environmental 
insecurities in the region, with the exception of climate change. 
Two scholars, Lichtenthaeler and Swain, observe that well drilling increased the 
rate of groundwater depletion occurred in Yemen. From the period of 1970 to 2004, the 
deep tube water wells permitted irrigated areas to increase from 37,000 to 407,000 
hectares.29 Also, irresponsible crop growing persisted. Yemenis shifted from drought-
resistant crops to growing water-intensive cash crops, like citrus fruits and bananas.30 This 
caused the water crisis to grow exponentially worse. Coupled with climate change and the 
variation in pattern of seasonal rains to replenish surface water runoffs and dams, the 
Yemenis steered head first into a water scarce environment. Groundwater is not replenished 
as fast as other water sources; to avoid depletion, governments must regulate groundwater 
extraction in arid areas of the world.31 In another source, Swain argues that groundwater 
 
26 Daniel Varisco, “Pumping Yemen Dry: A History of Yemen’s Water Crisis,” Human Ecology 47, 
no. 3 (June 2019): 317–29, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10745-019-0070-y; Lackner, Yemen in Crisis; Swain, 
Managing Water Conflict; Gerhard Lichtenthaeler, “Water Conflict and Cooperation in Yemen,” Middle 
East Report, no. 254 (April 2010): 30–35; Aliza Herzberg, “Urban Water Scarcity in Sana’a, Yemen,” 
Focus 15, no. 1 (April 2019): 100–107. 
27 Lackner, Yemen in Crisis, 218. 
28 Varisco, “Pumping Yemen Dry,” 318. 
29 Lichtenthaeler, “Water Conflict and Cooperation in Yemen,” 1. 
30 Lichtenthaeler, 1. 
31 Ashok Swain, “A New Challenge: Water Scarcity in the Arab World,” Arab Studies Quarterly 20, 
no. 1 (January 1998): 3. 
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can only be renewed once every 1400 years and that groundwater has to be extracted in an 
environmentally friendly way.32 Swain further states: 
When the extraction rate from underground basins exceed renewal rate, 
which is known as groundwater ‘mining’, the result is a falling water table 
and surface level. The falling of the water tables of coastal aquifers 
increases the likelihood of the infiltration of saline water, making water 
unsuitable for human use. Away from coastal areas, over-consumption of 
the aquifers leads either to their drying up completely, or the water table is 
lowered so much that it greatly increases the cost of pumping.33 
This aptly describes the problems which Yemen is facing. 
Many scholars observe that the lack of infrastructure caused by the ongoing civil 
war has exacerbated the water crisis and led to the emergence of more environmental 
insecurities such as famine and a cholera outbreak.34 This increases the suffering of 
Yemenis and causes more of them to migrate to other settlements and cities that are already 
struggling to provide the bear minimum for their current inhabitants. The Integrated Food 
Security Phase Classification (IPC) remains at level three, crisis, or above for an estimated 
15.9 million people.35 The map in Figure 2 from the World Food Programme portrays how 
severe the lack of food remains in Yemen. Note that the famine rating applies to some of 
the most populated areas in the country. 
 
32 Swain, Managing Water Conflict, 17. 
33 Swain, 17. 
34 Ali A. Rabaan, “Cholera: An Overview with Reference to the Yemen Epidemic,” Frontiers of 
Medicine 13, no. 2 (June 2018): 213–28, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11684-018-0631-2; Amal A. Kandeel, 
“Food Insecurity: The Basic Threat in an Overburdened Region,” Middle East Policy 21, no. 4 (November 
2014): 84–91, https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12097; Robins and Fergusson, “Groundwater Scarcity and 
Conflict – Managing Hotspots”; William A. Rugh, “Problems in Yemen, Domestic and Foreign,” Middle 
East Policy 22, no. 4 (January 2015): 151, https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12164; Fakirah, “Yemen Conflict,” 
16; Dyoulgerov, Bucher, and Zermoglio, “Vulnerability, Risk Reduction, and Adaption to Climate Change: 
Yemen,” 2. 
35 Global Network Against Food Crises and World Food Programme, “2020 Global Report on Food 






Figure 2. Yemen Food Insecurity Situation Depicted via IPCs36 
The cost of food plays a role in how environmental insecurities are affecting the 
country. Burki postulates that the hunger crisis in Yemen is directly due to a major oil 
pipeline being cut in 2011, causing fuel prices to increase over 500% and preventing 
farmers from using well pumps to irrigate their crops.37 Several reports and videos point 
out that malnutrition is not directly reflected by the lack of farmland and availability of 
food for purchase. Rather, it is that the Yemenis are unable to purchase food because their 
society lacks the ability to build a prosperous life that can afford them the opportunity to 
purchase it.38 This points to the lack of governance and its failure to build a sustainable 
 
36 Source: Global Network Against Food Crises and World Food Programme, 190. 
37 Talha Burki, “Yemen’s Hunger Crisis,” The Lancet 380, no. 9842 (August 2012): 637, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(12)61356-7. 
38 Isa Blumi, “Plundering Yemen and Its Post-Spring Hiatus,” in Destroying Yemen (Oakland, 
California: University of California Press, 2018), 170–200; Inside The World’s Worst Humanitarian Crisis 
(VICE on HBO, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RWOPlynTcmk; The War in Yemen: People 
Suffer Due to Lack of Clean Water (TRT World, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=NK2FlTwv0EY. 
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infrastructure of energy and water sources as possible root causes of the country’s 
problems. 
Kandeel and Varisco conclude that climate change and lack of rainfall have 
exacerbated the environmental insecurities in the country.39 Up until the late 1970s, 
Yemeni farmers depended on rainfall and irrigation ditches to accumulate water on their 
land. The rainfall helped feed groundwater sources and allowed for springs to flow from 
the mountains in the Sa’dah region to assist in irrigation. Once the rains stopped coming 
as frequently, the Yemenis turned to diesel pumps to extract groundwater. As the 
population multiplied, more people entered the realm of agriculture and caused an even 
larger strain on the sources of water. Varisco wrote, “Yemen needs to modernize but due 
to the conflict and lack of education for the populace, the only good option is attempting 
to figure out how local farming can be more profitable.”40 At the same time, the World 
Bank forecasted in 2011 that climate change would likely have a negative effect on 
agriculture because rainfall would be more infrequent and catastrophic when it arrived.41 
Their predictions were correct and torrential rains in 2019 and 2020 killed scores of 
people.42 Climate change is likely to have a negative effect on Yemen. However, due to 
the lack of available data on rain patterns and climate change within the borders of Yemen, 
it is difficult to determine trends in the region with certainty. 
In sum, there is a variety of research on environmental security issues affecting 
conflicts in different regions across the globe. To put it in perspective, UN Secretary 
General Antonio Guterres declared in 2020, “Four people out of every five, twenty-four 
million people in all, need lifesaving aid in what remains the world’s largest humanitarian 
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crisis.”43 Time is running out in Yemen and immediate action is required to solve this 
crisis. Determining how environmental insecurities have had a direct impact on the civil 
war here will help uncover a solution. Discovering how groups in the country are using 
environmental insecurities to their advantage will also assist in this endeavor. More 
research and synthesis are required to determine the answers to these questions. 
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis seeks to discover whether a country’s insecure environment could 
worsen a conflict. If citizens do not have food or water, does the conflict increase? I 
hypothesize that resource scarcity in this context will intensify the conflict. In addition, I 
will need to prove the opposite can be an option; that if citizens do have food or water then 
conflict will lessen. Many researchers have argued about whether climate change affects 
or causes conflict. The purpose of this research is not to find an answer to this currently 
unsolved question but to attempt to solve the others. 
Environmental insecurity matters in the conflict in Yemen. Yet it is not clear how 
it matters. The research gathered so far points to one possible explanation. It seems that the 
environmental insecurities are a second or third order effect of the conflict. I hypothesize 
that environmental security issues were not a direct cause of the conflict but that the 
existing environmental insecurities exacerbated the ongoing crises to an unknown extent. 
If Yemenis cannot receive or obtain basic commodities such as electricity, water, and food, 
then their willingness to fight for a government or group that does not provide these 
services immediately diminishes.44 
As for the second question, I query whether obtaining solutions to environmental 
insecurities can help end the war. I hypothesize that the effects of environmental insecurity 
will be helpful in ending the ongoing civil war. The extreme suffering this country is 
experiencing is able to grab the attention of actors on the global stage. Now that more 
people are aware of the problems Yemen faces on a day-to-day basis, the region could 
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experience an overwhelming amount of attention and support to assist in solving their 
predicaments. On the other hand, the effects of environmental insecurity could be harmful 
because all sides in the conflict can and do weaponize the lack of food and water. This is a 
tactic used frequently against Yemeni citizens in order to deter their support of the 
established government run by Hadi. In addition, I hypothesize that environmental 
insecurities are a tool of state building. Due to the failure of the National Dialogue 
Conference in ratifying the proposed six state solution with Yemen, factions may be 
attempting to use insecurities like water scarcity and famine to garner support for their 
cause. Foreign forces, like Saudi Arabia, may actually be using insecurities in order to 
create security issues within the region and prolong the conflict. 
Yemen faces environmental security crises that should be addressed and fixed. At 
this juncture, I hypothesize a viable option is to install water management teams to facilitate 
education and on-the-ground training to the population.45 Is this a suitable and credible 
choice during an ongoing civil war? It is with adequate force protection. However, the 
systems the government chooses to build need to be reinforced and better developed for war 
zones than previous models.46 Furthermore, if sustainable and effective farming practices 
can be implemented in Yemen, then a large source of their water scarcity problems can be 
controlled.47 If a concerted effort is made to discuss alternative and varying water abstraction 
methods among villages, then progress can be made in alleviating water scarcity in farmlands 
and allow for other methods to come to fruition.48 Virtual water may be helpful in 
environments like Yemen where politicians will not need to confront water scarcity head on; 
items that require a gross amount of water can be acquired via trade and wars can be avoided 
in the future.49 Sustainable opportunities exist to alleviate this crisis. 
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D. RESEARCH DESIGN AND SCOPING 
The research design largely focused on identifying the environmental insecurities 
that are affecting the ongoing civil war in Yemen. The research proceeded in several ways. 
To begin, preliminary grounding research included understanding how Yemen operated, 
what the physical environment consisted of, and how the latest civil war began. I had to make 
difficult choices about what data and research to include and what to exclude. I made these 
decisions by determining whether the data and journal articles were relevant to the 
environmental insecurity aspect I was pursuing. Then, I identified possible connections 
between environmental insecurities and the armed conflict in Yemen and evaluated whether 
each of these existed in this case. Finally, I assessed which policy solutions were possible in 
this particular case. 
The time period for this research is the Yemeni civil war. Examining the war 
established a clear baseline for where the country currently stands. Helen Lackner’s 2019 
book, Yemen in Crisis, provided an excellent resource for this information. This analysis 
utilized data showing how environmental insecurity issues can be weaponized in order to 
reach a certain end. It is clear in my initial fact-finding that most researchers have asserted 
wars are not started over water; however, the idea that water can be used as a weapon is a 
salient one. The groundwork examined other non-traditional security threats. Food security 
is a category of non-traditional security threat. This theoretical perspective helped in 
analyzing my hypotheses. There was an opportunity to compare whether environmental 
securities or other non-traditional security threats are important factors.  
The research identified solutions regarding how best to solve the environmental 
insecurity issues. There is a lack of research on how to do this in Yemen specifically but 
there are examples in other areas of the world that I drew on. This probe examined Yemen’s 
history after 1962. One of the major indicators for this decision is the fact that most 
environmental data on Yemen is scarce and has not been recorded until the latter half of the 
twentieth century. The historical era prior to 1962 did not appear to bring substantial evidence 
to light on their environmental insecurities. 
14 
Part of my investigation invested some time in Arabic resources. Many of the sources 
I obtained came from a Western perspective and were written by a Western author. In order 
to better understand the plight of the people and their understandings of what has happened 
to their country, I found sources in their language. Among these were social media statements 
of officials and researchers in Yemen. This research focused on assessing whether Al-Qaeda 
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) or the Houthi rebels created environmental insecurities for 
their benefit. For example, a government could instigate food and water shortages in order 
for citizens to join the military. Actions like these may be taking place in Yemen, too. Having 
access to additional primary sources would have amplified this thesis but due to the ongoing 
conflict and COVID-19, I did not have access to these. 
This research uncovered specific narratives on how people experienced 
environmental security issues. People interpreted a lack of water in their region several 
different ways. Some believed the insecurity was due to the Houthis while others believed 
the Houthis were doing their best to combat the environmental insecurity. When humans are 
starving and thirsty, their individual experiences can be far different than one would suppose. 
In the past and world as a whole, research uncovered links between charity organizations and 
political regimes creating allegiances. This may also be happening in Yemen.  
Some assert that the conflict in Yemen is looking increasingly unsolvable. Bruce 
Reidel emphasizes the following variables are hindering any progress: negative contributions 
from Saudi Arabia, the remaining Hadi government, the humanitarian crisis, and Iranian 
influence.50 The thesis considered these additional explanatory factors in order to determine 
how environmental insecurities, specifically, are contributing to instability in Yemen. 
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II. BACKGROUND OF YEMEN 
To fully understand how Yemen has fallen into the predicaments of its current day, 
grasping the history of this country is vital. The ROY morphed over time through several 
different transition periods that began in 1962. Whereas many countries have a constant 
glideslope in the positive direction for growth, Yemen enjoyed more of a rollercoaster effect. 
Nonetheless, the governments of both the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and People’s 
Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) failed to develop a sustainable economy for their 
citizens. The country’s lack of infrastructure, especially for water, sanitation, and hygiene 
(WASH) and diversity of crops, directly contributed to the poor humanitarian situation in the 
country today. 
To begin, this chapter will discuss the pre-unification period in regards to the 
establishment of the YAR and PDRY. The chapter will then pivot to discuss the history of the 
unification and the events that occurred between 1990 and 2011. The final section will explore 
the happenings in Yemen after the Arab Spring in 2011 and the current situation in Yemen. 
The history is divided into these three subsections because the different government structures 
ruled the country that played a pivotal role in how environmental insecurities were pushed 
aside or not considered. The decisions of these governments and the conflicts that revolved 
around them are important to explore in order to understand why Yemen faces the 
environmental insecurities that it does.  
A. PRE-UNIFICATION PERIOD 
Post-1962 Yemen was different country than the Yemen of today. To start with, the 
territory of the current country existed under different authorities. In the South, Yemen was 
called the Aden Colony, broken up into an Eastern and Western Protectorate, and was under 
British colonial rule until 1962.51 In the North, the YAR was well established by the 
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Mutawakkilite Imamate following World War I and the Treaty of Taif.52 From 1962–1968, 
both regions experienced civil wars that would shape their countries for the next few decades 
and served as a proxy for the Cold War between USSR and U.S., in addition to Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia.53 In the following decades, both governments who ruled the two regions 
“claimed to be the bearers of nationalist legitimacy and to represent the whole country.”54 
This section will discuss the histories of both regions until their unification in 1990. It will 
become clear that the ROY of today was divided into two very different regions and that the 
inactions of both in regard to environmental issues contributed to the current predicament. 
1. Southern Yemen—PDRY 
Prior to 1962, Britain played a key role in the development of South Yemen. The 
British utilized the port of Aden as a crucial point to connect vessels navigating from the Suez 
Canal to India.55 Although the British did not directly rule all of southern Yemen, they 
generally controlled much of the decision-making processes up until this point. The British 
government envisioned a much more unified protectorate by 1962, but, instead, the area dove 
into a civil war aimed at achieving liberation from British rule. Not unlike many other Middle 
Eastern regions where the British exercised colonial powers after WWI and WWII, setting up 
Yemen for success after the colonial powers were gone was not high on their list of priorities. 
The first civil war lasted approximately five years from 1962–1967. Two main fronts 
developed against the British colonizers: the Front for the Liberation of South Yemen 
(FLOSY) and the National Liberation Front (NLF).56 In 1967, the British Federal Army had 
enough insight to realize the NLF would succeed over FLOSY and established a truce in order 
to retain some semblance of power in the newly established region. The ideologies of the NLF 
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and FLOSY were fairly similar: anti-British. However, both FLOSY and the NLF developed 
socialist tendencies as FLOSY was strongly affected by Nasserism and the NLF became 
affected by the Movement of Arab Nationalists (MAN).57 The NLF won the war and the UK 
departed Yemen on 30 November 1967, the same day the PDRY was officially established.58 
Due to the lack of a permanent border between the South and North, ideologies mixed during 
the 1960s as members of FLOSY migrated to Northern Yemen upon their defeat and 
attempted to spread their left-leaning ways in the YAR. This was surprising as the guardians 
of FLOSY could have stayed in South Yemen and helped the NLF in the development of their 
own socialist agenda. Their hopes of creating socialism in both the North and the South were 
not successful. By the 1970s, the South became known throughout the world as the PDRY 
and fully embraced the socialist ideology. The leadership structure of the PDRY consisted of 
a President, Vice President, and Prime Minister. 
Identifying who led FLOSY and NLF during the civil war was a difficult task. 
Following the civil war, factions in the NLF split down the middle and it was a challenge for 
a true leader to appear. The leadership became less murky in 1970 when Salem Ruba’i Ali, or 
Salmeen, became the leader of the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) and PDRY.59 A clear 
representation of the PDRY government was finally established. He was very popular among 
the people of the PDRY but he fell out of favor with the NLF when he continued to circumvent 
party structures in order to pursue his personal objectives.60 Salmeen was assassinated in 1978 
and Abdul Fattah Ismail became the leader of the PDRY until the ascendency of Ali Salem 
al-Beedh following the events in 1986 that will be discussed further below. 
The people of the PDRY were primarily employed in subsistence farming and 
fisheries. Farmers were heavily dependent on rain-fed agriculture. The British had established 
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functional spate irrigation structures in rural areas in order to help assist this region.61 Spate 
irrigation is a technique in which rainwater is cultivated and held in storage areas then diverted 
to areas that require the water.62 Meanwhile, the national capital, Aden, became an 
international hub due to its deep-water port and international airport. The city provided the 
entire country with world-renowned medical facilities and an entry point for travelers to reach 
the YAR in the north until 1967 when the Suez Canal was closed.63 As the PDRY further 
developed in the 1980s, the government decided to nationalize almost all private businesses 
in order to build revenue.64 This initiative focused mainly on agriculture, fisheries, and 
infrastructure. The South struggled to attract international financial support due to the socialist 
nature of the state; it could only rely on the USSR until the unification of Yemen in the early 
1990s.65  
Even though the socialist state failed to become an economic regional power, the 
PDRY succeeded in many other elements during its time in power. Education, land 
ownership, secularism, and women’s rights were all very successful in the South compared to 
its neighbor to the North and many other countries in the Middle East. Tackling the illiteracy 
rate was a key goal of the regime. The government wanted to ensure all people had an equal 
opportunity to learn and seek higher education. Outside of Tunisia, the PDRY’s 1974 Family 
Law was the most progressive for women.66 Women had rights very similar to men in which 
they could initiate divorce, hold jobs, and avoid polygamy in their relationships. Women 
played a powerful role in the PDRY society.  
Politics within the PDRY was dangerous for those who chose to run for office, as there 
was hardly any peace during the election processes. The lives of everyday citizens were 
generally unaffected, but turmoil persisted at the bureaucratic level. When the NLF morphed 
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into the YSP in 1978, political violence only intensified.67 Ali Nasser Mohammad served as 
the prime minister of the PDRY beginning in 1971, but in 1985 he gained the roles of secretary 
general of the YSP and state president.68 In 1986, during the “13 January Events,” Ali Nasser 
attempted to massacre every enemy in high levels of the government.69 Although the 
massacre was not completely successful, a few high-ranking members of Ali Nasser’s regime, 
including the current President of Yemen, Abdu Rabbu Mansur Hadi, fled the PDRY for 
sanctuary in the YAR and Ali al-Beedh was victorious and became the country’s leader in 
1986.70 This event marked a significant change of life for the worse for those living in the 
PDRY, due to a breakdown of most government functions. In addition, the rest of the world 
began to see the decline of Communism as the USSR began to face their own economic 
battles. As the PDRY discovered oil in the late 1980s their economy rebounded slightly, but 
negotiations to unify with the YAR had already begun. 
2. Northern Yemen—YAR 
Between WWI and 1962, the northern region was ruled by three separate Imams who 
were constantly threatened with eviction by the people. In 1962, a military coup overthrew 
the third Imam and attempted to establish the YAR.71 Instead, the country fell into a civil war 
that lasted eight years between those who supported the ruling of the Imams and those who 
supported a republican regime. The republican regime was supported by officers who had 
been educated in Egypt and understood the rise of Nasserism and Arab Nationalism, and 
hoped to spread it in Yemen.72 Egypt supported the civil war on the side of the republicans 
until 1967 when Egyptians were surprised by the Six Day War from Israel. At this juncture, 
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the region experiences two foreign interventions. Saudi Arabia intervened to support the 
Imams, using religion as a justification for their intervention. Egypt intervened to establish a 
more republican and communist ideology in the South.73 As the communist government 
began to rise in the South, a right-of-center government began to rise in the North. 
Instability within the ranks of the YAR persisted during the 1970s. The civil war ended 
in 1970 due to the withdrawal of Egyptian forces, the overthrow of their puppet-President, al-
Sallal, and the official end of the imamate.74 A series of coups and assassinations in the late 
1960s through 1970s resulted in the rise of Colonel Ali Abdullah Saleh in July of 1978.75 
With the removal of British forces from the South during the 1960s, most Western influence 
was removed from both regions.76 According to Lackner, when Yemenis recount this period 
in their history, the Yemeni elders tend to skip over the rulers except for one in particular.77 
His name was Ibrahim al-Hamdi and he has been immortalized in their minds as the perfect 
ruler for the YAR due to his ambition to develop a fair and independent Yemen. He ruled 
from 1974 and was assassinated in 1977 before any of these high hopes could be thoroughly 
created.78 Outside of Hamdi, Saleh became the most powerful leader of the YAR until 
unification. 
The YAR economy depended on patronage and remittances. Oil has never been a 
major provider of money for the government due to limited oil reserves within its borders. 
Saleh was unable to build a government that could financially support the people because so 
many Yemeni worked outside the country in order to provide their families with living 
wages.79 Between 1979 to 2000, only 20% of the population moved from loose governance 
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in rural domains to urban cities with more governance.80 Due to open borders with Saudi 
Arabia until 1991, the government lacked the ability to collect taxes on many Yemeni and 
was unable to establish a cash flow to provide services that many other governments in the 
world could provide from taxation.81 Yemenis worked in Saudi Arabia and paid zero taxes 
towards the Yemeni government. Due to a lack of tax collection, governance, and the ability 
to provide adequate infrastructure for water, sanitation, electricity, and farming, many 
Yemenis used their own money to invest in themselves. With no government regulation or 
accountability, natural resources began to be over exploited. Even though many Yemenis 
worked abroad, their families needed food so they relied on subsistence farming. This meant 
that many Yemeni needed to invest in a diesel pump for extracting groundwater. This will be 
further discussed in Chapter 3. 
Islam is a significant part of Yemen and two major sects have defined the majority of 
its population. In the North, a version of Shia Islam called Zaydism exists while in the South 
Sunni Shafi’sm is more prevalent.82 The key difference between the belief of Twelver Shiism, 
prevalent in Iran, and Zaydi Shiism, also known as the Fivers, is that the Zaydis believe their 
founder to be Zayd bin ‘Ali, the great grandson of Ali bin Abi Talib, who revolted after the 
death of Imam al-Husayn’s death in Karbala.83 Due to its close proximity to Saudi Arabia, 
the North found many of their education opportunities to be funded and/or provided by Saudi 
Arabia. The intrusion of Wahhabism had a direct effect on the belief systems instilled in public 
education. The spread of movements like the Houthi movement can be directly attributed to 
the imposition of Saudi religious ideologies enforced on those who believed differently, 
especially the Zaydis in the North.84 In addition, urban cities grew as Yemenis in the North 
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moved from rural areas in order to find a better quality of life and jobs. Many grew 
discouraged when their move was in vain and they were unable to find employment or 
additional education opportunities outside of those provided by Sunni-dominant ideology. 
Tribalism played a role in the development of Northern Yemen and continues till 
today. Tribalism is difficult to define due to the way scholars have oversimplified its meaning 
to make sense in colonial terms in the past few decades.85 Yemeni tribalism, not unlike many 
other Middle East and North African (MENA) countries, was a way of life for both regions 
in Yemen before the establishment of the PDRY and YAR. In the PDRY, tribalism was 
officially rooted out in order to create space for a more socialist society. In reality, however, 
tribalism was never really removed from any aspect of the Yemeni’s lives.86 The conflict 
surrounding the Houthis originally arose from tribal disputes in the North but the conflict itself 
cannot be attributed solely to tribal tendencies.87 Tribes in Yemen are formed from a variety 
of factors: common ancestry, economic means of productivity, honorable circumstances, 
chieftain lineage, and laws.88 The government did their best to distribute representation 
among all factions in government positions, but nepotism and favoritism consistent with 
families or tribes persisted.89 This problem persists with the current government of Yemen 
and there does not appear to be any end in sight for this type of behavior. 
B. UNIFICATION TO 9/11 
It would be naive to think that the borders between the PDRY and YAR were not 
porous. Over time, families and tribes merged through trade, marriages, and other 
arrangements, not unlike many other countries in the Middle East. These relationships were 
able to pull the two countries slightly closer together.90 Although not the sole reason for the 
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unification in 1990, this was one of the main contributing factors. Other reasons include the 
discovery of oil on the country’s borders and the steady decline of socialism in the world as a 
whole.91 Saleh was able to hastily draw the two countries together and solidify his power 
using patron-client relationships to make his power more concrete instead of working to create 
a new, democratic country that could be beneficial for all of its citizens.92 The countries had 
a choice either to go to war or overcome their differences and find a solution. The leaders 
chose the latter. 
Helen Lackner sums up the unification process and how quickly it fell into place in 
November 1989: 
As the negotiations were still under debate, few expected the sudden and 
complete unification which was agreed between Ali Abdullah Saleh and Ali 
Salem al-Beedh on 13 November 1989. Discussion within the ruling groups 
on both sides of the border had favoured a federal approach to unification 
based on a standard formula of allocating responsibility for foreign affairs and 
overall national security to agencies representing the whole country, while 
each existing entity would retain autonomy for economic policy and internal 
administration. Increasingly frequent meetings between the leadership of the 
two states ended with a tête à tête between al-Beedh and Saleh which 
concluded with a late-night announcement of full unification.93 
The era from 1990–1994 involved its own set of challenges, as the countries attempted 
to merge. Two key issues that ran relatively smoothly under the PDRY’s ruling administration 
before unification were disrupted: the ROY under Saleh regressed in its openness towards 
women and inflation hit the country extremely hard.94 The honeymoon phase of the 
unification did not last for very long, especially for women. When unification occurred, the 
government of the PDRY was hoping for their liberal stance on women to carry over into the 
new society established under the Republic of Yemen (ROY). Economically, the ROY was 
in great pain. President Saleh erred by deciding to support the Iraqi regime during the first 
 
91 Lackner, 117. 
92 Brian M. Perkins, “Yemen: Between Revolution and Regression,” Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism 40, no. 4 (2017): 304, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1205368. 
93 Lackner, Yemen in Crisis, 117. 
94 Lackner, 118–19. 
24 
Gulf War.95 The Yemenis working around the Middle East, especially in Saudi Arabia, were 
forced to return home to the ROY with no job prospects, detrimentally affecting the 
remittances their families depended on for their welfare.  
Unfortunately, the peace between the two country’s leaders lasted only a few years 
when the unified country fell into its first civil war in 1994.96 Al-Beedh, who had served as 
vice president of the ROY, attempted to disconnect from the ROY in 1994 and create the 
Democratic Republican of Yemen (DRY).97 His efforts were unsuccessful and many of the 
people who supported al-Beedh would go into hiding until 2011 when protests erupted 
throughout the country. President Saleh became the ultimate leader of Yemen after he and the 
General People’s Congress (GPC) defeated al-Beedh and the YSP in the civil war of 1994. 
Saleh decided to revert the country to his previous system of governance in the YAR: a 
patronage system. The system relied on companies, tribal leaders, and business owners being 
friendly with Saleh in order to be successful.98 Although the country proclaimed itself to be 
democratic and shared seats in the government with parties like YSP, the Islah, Baathist, and 
Zaydis, the real powerhouse in the country became the GPC. Realizing his mistake during the 
Gulf War, President Saleh was one of the first people in the Middle East to call President 
George W. Bush in Washington to give his unwavering support to the United States after 9/
11.99 This allowed Yemen to receive military aid from various countries across the world. 
Yet, the ROY continued to stagnate economically and Saleh’s leadership proved to be more 
autocratic and less democratic in the long run.  
C. 9/11 TO THE ARAB SPRING 
During Saleh’s tenure post-9/11, various political organizations took root in the ROY. 
Among these included the Islah and the Zaydi Houthi movement. A little more than half of 
 
95 Judith Miller, “Mideast Tensions; Yemen’s Chief Assails Saudis On Gulf Crisis,” The New York 
Times, October 26, 1990, sec. A. 
96 Perkins, “Yemen,” 308. 
97 Cavatorta and Durac, “Yemen,” 100. 
98 Perkins, “Yemen,” 305. 
99 Lackner, Yemen in Crisis, xxiv. 
25 
the population of the ROY is estimated to be Sunni Muslim while the remaining population 
is estimated to be Zaydis, a part of Shia Islam.100 Exact numbers are not known due to a lack 
of surveys conducted on the population of the ROY in recent years. Islah is a political Islam 
movement that was created in the 1990s by tribal and religious leaders, mainly headed by 
Shaykh Abd Allah ibn Hussayn al-Ahmar, in order to compete against the GPC and YSP.101 
Islah received much of its funding from Saudi Arabia and desired for the ROY legal system 
to be based on sharia.102 Islah is an anti-communist political group with a mix of Islamist 
doctrine, but they are not equivalent to a party like the Muslim Brotherhood.103 Zaydism is 
closely associated with the Houthi movement and is considered to be a part of Shia Islam but 
they diverge in the belief that Imams are infallible and legitimized by Allah.104 These two 
groups served as the main opposing political parties to Saleh’s GPC until the advent of the 
AQAP.  
Although the Houthi name was not popular in the news until 2015, the group had 
actually begun fighting against the Saleh government a little over a decade before. The 
organization partook in six battles with the government between 2004 and 2010.105 The 
movement grew in size following each fight. An interesting intervention came from Qatar 
during the fourth round of fighting. The country acted as a mediator to end the fighting, but 
Saleh did not approve of the Qatari’s willingness to support him in his reconstruction 
efforts.106 Saleh convinced himself that he could make Yemen successful without the support 
of other countries. His patronage system worked for him and his cronies. When a country that 
was succeeding on multiple economic fronts, like Qatar, came to his aid, he saw this as threat 
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to everything he had built.107 The country continued on a downward spiral after each Houthi 
battle due to the destruction of hospitals, roads, homes, water systems, and electric grids. 
After the sixth battle with the Houthis in 2010, the world began to hear rumblings that 
the Houthis were receiving financial backing from Iran.108 This story played out across the 
world and was a defining moment for the Houthis. The Houthis were painted as an accessory 
movement to the Iranian government with no proof other than hearsay by some 
researchers.109 However, some believe the Quds Forces of Iran are working closely with 
Ansar Allah, another common name for the Houthis.110 Recently, the Houthis have been 
identified as “more of a strategic partner than a proxy” of Iran.111 The Houthi movement 
wanted to unseat the Saleh government but they were not pushing for a more democratic 
system.112 Whenever the Houthis occupied a new area, they eradicated those who resisted 
and burned down the dwellings they occupied. On the other hand, Saleh and his military did 
not show any less violent use of force towards the Houthis. As the years progressed and their 
ideas narrowed into a more solidified movement, a consensus was reached that the Houthis 
ultimately wanted a more autocratic system centered around sharia.113 They were beginning 
to gain land in the North to make their desires more of a reality after every clash with the 
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government. By 2011, the country had been in clashes with the Houthis for more than six 
years. 
D. ARAB SPRING TO PRESENT DAY 
2011 began with protests around the MENA. Yemen was not spared from these 
events. With all that had occurred during the 2000s with skirmishes between the Houthis and 
the Yemen government, the protests were no surprise. The people of Yemen were fed up with 
the lack of resources, jobs, and economic prospects. Experts believe revolutions occur because 
people are tired of their government and see no other way for it to change except to hit the 
streets and stay there until a new government is formed.114 Saleh had ruled the country since 
1991 and did not facilitate a prosperous life for those outside of his inner circle. Thus, 
revolution was inevitable in Yemen. 
In the years leading up to the 2011 protests, the North and South developed into 
distinct problem areas for Saleh. The Houthi rebels obtained a large swath of land in the North. 
They merged forces with the Islah party after the protests in 2011 and their official slogan was 
launched in 2012: “God is great, Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse on the Jews, Victory 
for Islam.”115 In the South, a separatists movement had been established in 2006 by retired 
military and government officers from the PDRY who were no longer found relevant by the 
new Yemeni government following the 1994 civil war.116 During the protests of 2011, these 
Southern Separatists aspired to give governing another shot after seeing the haphazard way 
Saleh had run the country. They felt it was their turn to make decisions.117 In addition, the 
South began to struggle with food, finance, and fuel, also known as the “Triple F,” as the 
region experienced a series of droughts damaging many of their cash crops like coffee.118 
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The protesters began to press for a more democratic system and the desire to end corruption 
in the government.119  
The protests were similar to those occurring in other parts of the MENA, but differed 
from them in some key ways. In Yemen, the movement was not centered in one major city. 
Rather, it was spread throughout the country in the North and the South.120 This shows that 
people in many urban centers thought the time had come for Saleh to end his reign. It cannot 
be said that the protests were any larger in Yemen than elsewhere in the MENA region, but 
the fact that they were widespread throughout the country leads to the second major 
difference. Almost every walk of life in Yemen were represented at the 2011 protests.121 
Tribal communities, farmers, educated citizens, and everyone in between were represented, 
but they were quickly discarded during the negotiation process when the protests stopped.122 
If there was ever a time for change in Yemen, it would be at this juncture. 
The protests in Yemen began in January of 2011, but Yemen did not have a new 
President until February of 2012. During the course of the year, there were several events that 
showed Saleh’s unwillingness to step down. The UN and GCC stepped in to dictate how the 
country could survive the protests and determined that Saleh would be unable to be the leader 
to assist them in this process. The GCC Initiative was created in April 2011 to allow the 
country to create a new constitution and elect a new leader.123 Saleh, unsurprisingly, did not 
see this as a credible option for him and his regime. In June 2011, there was an attempt on his 
life at a mosque that nearly killed him.124 Fighting ensued and eventually, the GCC initiative 
was signed in November of 2011.125 The initiative allowed for former Vice President Hadi 
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to become the interim president for two years until a new constitution was created and another 
presidential election would be held. However, Saleh retained control of his political party, the 
GPC, and continued to wield power behind Hadi’s back.126 The attempt at cooperation and 
unity within the country would begin a full year after the initial protests. 
The National Dialogue Conference (NDC) was a potential step towards stability in 
Yemen. This conference, beginning in March 2013 and ending in January 2014, was seen as 
a great effort to bring all walks of life in Yemen together to forge a new plan for the 
country.127 This conference commenced with high aspirations and it ended in complete 
failure. The conference had two main goals: ending the transitional period with a fresh 
constitution and conducting national elections. Both failed to come to fruition.128 The 
cooperation efforts were not going well at this juncture due to so many different actors 
wanting to take the ROY in their own direction. The Houthis desired for a larger majority of 
land and resources in the North and thus seized the capital of Sana’a; leaving the South 
unprotected to Al-Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) forces.129 With everyone trying 
to take control, the country lacked clear governance on who would determine their fate. 
The seventh war between the Houthis and the ROY officially began in January of 
2015 when the Houthis interrupted the delivery of the finalized constitution with the proposal 
to divide Yemen into six regions under the Hadi government. Many foresaw the government 
returning power to Saleh; this would mean the eradication of the Houthis in the North.130 
Hadi initially used his military forces to fight in the North, while abandoning many in the 
South to AQAP. He subsequently resigned and fled Yemen for Saudi Arabia, where he 
remains today.131 While Saleh was out of the Hadi government, Saleh saw an opportunity to 
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align with the Houthis. After fighting began, the situation became ever more confusing when 
Saleh and the Houthis joined forces. Saleh believed that, with the recent spread of the Houthi 
movement across the North, his best chances of retaining power in Yemen would be with the 
Houthis. However, he was wrong. 
AQAP also participated in the conflict. In 2015, they took up arms against the Houthis 
and attempted to create another Sunni-Shia divide.132 Although KSA and AQAP are fighting 
the Houthis, the Saudis have made it clear they are not aligning themselves with AQAP.133 
AQAP continues to play a substantial role as one of the three ruling powers in Yemen. Figure 
3 illustrates where the Houthis expanded during the civil war. 
 
Figure 3. Houthi Expansion from 2012–2015134 
 
132 Ayisha Amr, “How Al Qaeda Rules in Yemen,” Foreign Affairs, October 28, 2015, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/yemen/2015-10-28/how-al-qaeda-rules-yemen. 
133 Daniel L. Byman, “The U.S.-Saudi Arabia Counterterrorism Relationship,” § House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs (2016), 4, https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/the-u-s-saudi-arabia-counterterrorism-
relationship/. 
134 Source: Adam Baron, “Mapping the Yemen Conflict,” European Council on Foreign Relations, 
October 19, 2015, https://ecfr.eu/special/yemen/. 
31 
Additional impediments toward cooperation emerged after the 2015 re-eruption of 
violence throughout the country. These include foreign involvement in the conflict. Some 
observers have come to the conclusion that Saudi Arabia and the U.S. back the Hadi-led 
government, the UAE backs the Southern separatists, and the Houthis are backed by 
Iran.135 Leaders from the former PDRY in the South also began to appear and demand a 
return to the old days; a separate North and South Yemen.136 The complexity of the 
situation does not allow for a clear path towards cooperation between anyone in the region. 
Additionally, while these proxy wars are playing out, the interests of the Yemenis, who 
began the protests in 2011, are being left behind.  
Today, Yemen is mostly controlled and influenced by the Hadi government. The Houthis 
maintain a stronghold in the North, which was predominantly the territory of the YAR 
before the ROY was established. AQAP has several other strongholds in the center of the 
country and the Southern Transition Council (STC) maintains control of two large southern 
cities.137 The conflict has grown disturbingly similar to Syria, in that a proxy war has 
erupted between Saudi Arabia and Iran, moving from a conflict between characters to a 
conflict between political parties causing a full-blown civil war within its borders.138 
Meanwhile, unemployment has skyrocketed, birth rates have soared, educational systems 
have failed and morale is at an all-time low.139 Yemen is struggling in almost every aspect 
of its life. 
The country has a long way to go before it can be controlled by one force. Figure 4 
shows the multiple forces in control of Yemen. The multiple forces existing within the 
borders are why dividing the country into six regions looked so amenable during the NDC. 
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Figure 4. Current Front Lines of Forces in Yemen140 
E. CONCLUSION 
The history of Yemen is not straightforward. There are no clear-cut allegiances. 
Bonds between political groups morph and change over time. Enemies become friends and 
friends become enemies. The history of this country matters because it demonstrates that 
the ROY, YAR, and the PDRY failed to effectively create institutions to take care of their 
citizens. The country’s political instability, coupled with many rulers’ limited efforts to 
improve the lives of the general population, meant that the governments failed to create 
WASH infrastructure, roads, hospitals, and effective agriculture techniques, or an effective 
bureaucracy where people could voice their concerns. 
History causes us to look back in time and try to figure out what went wrong. An 
article in The Atlantic in 2002 poses this very question for people in the Middle East. The 
people in MENA, especially Yemen, need to stop asking “Who did this to us?” and instead 
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focus on “What did we do wrong?” and “How can we fix this?” because the sooner they 
stop focusing on blame, the sooner they can begin repairing their country.141 Congress 
heard testimony from the Honorable Mary Beth Long in October of 2015 in which she 
explained although Saudi Arabia had good intentions to protect itself from the Houthi 
border threat, they lacked the foresight for a clear endgame.142 The country has two major 
problems: lack of government, who can provide the bare minimum infrastructure like 
WASH, and insecurity. In order for the people to feel like their country can provide some 
sort of future, there needs to be a government worthy of relying on. The next chapter will 
provide context on how environmental insecurities contribute to the ongoing conflict and 
how they are being used as weapons against the people in Yemen. 
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III. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES FACING YEMEN 
Environmental security issues add to the complexity of Yemen’s history. Since 
independence in 1962, the ROY and its predecessor states have failed to sufficiently 
develop vital infrastructure for water and food. Today, approximately 20.7 million people 
are struggling to find drinkable water and suitable food for consumption within the borders 
of Yemen.143 This chapter will examine the multiple environmental insecurities that exist 
in Yemen, including water insecurity, famine, and migration as an adaptive response. Then, 
the chapter will answer the questions pertaining to this thesis. How do environmental 
insecurity issues affect the civil war? Did environmental security issues exist before the 
war? Do they exist as a by-product of the war? Or, were they created as a tool for the war? 
The evidence shows that environmental insecurities have exacerbated the ongoing civil 
war and are used as a tool during fighting. The chapter also finds that, although these issues 
require immediate attention by the existing government and world partners, solving them 
will not end the conflict. The war must end to stop the disruption in migration, water and 
food supplies. 
Three terms require definition before progressing any further: water scarcity, food 
insecurity, and migration. Simply put, water scarcity involves conditions “when water 
demand exceeds supply.”144 There are several ways in which a geographical area can 
become water scarce. The first, rainwater plays a significant role in Yemen, which is 
dependent on seasonal floods during the months of March through May.145 As a result of 
climate change, rainwater is declining in Yemen and the frequency of droughts are 
increasing.146 If there is less rainwater, then there is less opportunity for those who live in 
the area to collect and use it. Overconsumption of groundwater is a second cause of water 
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scarcity. Research shows that groundwater extraction rates in Yemen exceed the natural 
recharge rate by five times.147 The third reason for water scarcity in Yemen, during its 
civil war, is targeting and destruction by local actors. The Saudi-led coalition in Yemen 
has been held responsible for 95 out of the 105 reported attacks on water infrastructure, 
including humanitarian storage units, water trucks, water pumps, water plants, and 
desalination systems.148  
A second term that should be defined is food insecurity. This means not knowing 
how, from where, or from whom your next meal will come.149 Food insecurity arises for 
several reasons. Crop-eating insects like fall armyworms and desert locusts demolish many 
of Yemen’s most important crops every year.150 The price of food is another cause of food 
insecurity. In 2020, prices for rice were 83% higher and those for wheat were 50% higher 
than historical averages over the past decade.151 In addition, where conflict exists, food 
insecurity tends to follow, due to the inability of getting vital sustenance into a given 
area.152 Finally, climate change plays a role in food insecurity. As discussed before, a lack 
of water affects the ability of many crops to grow and be used as a food source. As Yemen 
and the MENA continue to increase in temperature and experience droughts, food 
insecurity increases.153  
The last term to be defined in this section is migration. Migration can occur into, 
out of, and within a country. Several factors lead to migration. Food and water insecurity 
 
147 Taher, “Groundwater Abstraction Management in Sana’a Basin, Yemen,” 1593. 
148 Jeannie Sowers and Erika Weinthal, “Saudi-Led Attacks Devastated Yemen’s Civilian 
Infrastructure, Dramatically Worsening the Humanitarian Crisis,” The Washington Post, February 22, 
2021. 
149 Mark Lowcock and David Beasley, “We’ve Averted Famine in the Past — We Must Do It Again,” 
The Times, November 17, 2020, sec. comment, https://www.unocha.org/story/op-ed-we%E2%80%99ve-
averted-famine-past-%E2%80%93-we-must-do-it-again. 
150 Global Network Against Food Crises and World Food Programme, “2020 Global Report on Food 
Crises,” 188. 
151 Global Network Against Food Crises and World Food Programme, 188. 
152 Global Network Against Food Crises and World Food Programme, 189. 
153 Stephen Russell Fragaszy et al., “Drought Monitoring in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) Region: Participatory Engagement to Inform Early Warning Systems,” Bulletin of the American 
Meteorological Society 101, no. 7 (2020): E1149, https://doi.org/10.1175/BAMS-D-18-0084.1. 
37 
are two factors explained above that lead to migration. Yemen is currently home to 3.6 
million internally displaced persons (IDP), over 275 thousand refugees from the West coast 
of Africa, and approximately 1.3 million IDP returnees from around the MENA.154 IDP 
returnees means that Yemenis who were in other parts of MENA have returned to Yemen 
and are now identified as IDPs. Yemen is nonetheless experiencing a net loss of about 190 
migrants per 1000 people.155 In other words, more people are leaving Yemen than staying 
within the borders. Yemen’s net migration into the country may be slowing as a factor of 
the persisting war. 
A. ENVIRONMENTAL STRESSES BEFORE CIVIL WAR 
Water scarcity, famine, and migration are not new environmental insecurity issues 
for the people of Yemen. Due to its climate and location in the world, these factors have 
always been prevalent. This next section will elaborate on how these problems arose. It is 
important to understand the suspected reasons for these insecurities to ascertain their effect 
on the civil war. The environmental insecurities explained below existed before the civil 
war even began. 
1. Water Infrastructure 
Water is vital to all life on Earth. Early inhabitants of Yemen knew this would be a 
struggle for them when they began searching the geographical area for this resource. 
Groundwater, climate change, topology, and lack of applicable laws all contributed to the 
reasoning behind a lack of water security in the ROY. This section discloses how water in 
Yemen was difficult to come by prior to the advent of the civil war.  
Water in Yemen is scarce. Data shows that with its current population and annually 
renewed water resources being around 2.1 billion m3, Yemen has enough water for about 
140 m3 per person every year, which is extremely distant from the norm in the Middle East 
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and North Africa (MENA) of 1,250 m3 and worldwide of 7,500 m3.156 With the increase 
in fuel-powered wells since the 1970s, groundwater has been depleted very quickly by 
private wells. In 1997, tensions arose in the Taiz valley leading to deaths over this precious 
resource.157 The reason for the increase in use of water over time without any regulation 
falls on the desire of the people to raise cash crops instead of less water-intensive crops. 
The cash crops include fruit, vegetables, and qat, which happens to be the most profitable 
crop of them all in Yemen.158 Water scarcity affects the ability to gain clean water, 
sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) but it also plays an active role in other environmental 
stresses like famine and migration.  
The topology and climate of Yemen affects the way water is collected and dispersed 
throughout the region. The topographical regions of Yemen include the western mountains, 
the highlands in the middle of the country, and the dry east.159 Water is scarce below the 
surface, but due to high elevations on the western side of the country, rainfall is 
prevalent.160 Yemenis built terraces in the higher regions of Yemen in order to collect the 
rainfall and provide water for vegetables farmed at these altitudes. However, the system is 
intricate and time consuming, causing many Yemenis to invest in pumping water from 
groundwater.161 An important factor in this process is fuel; the pumps used are only 
operable by using fuel.162 Upper elevations receive a considerable amount of rain during 
monsoon seasons, but the ability to collect the water and use the runoff as a water source 
for irrigation and survivability was not adequately built for the region.163 For example, 
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Sana’a is located approximately 2,200 m above sea level and lives are lost every year 
because of flash floods that inundate the city and surrounding areas.164 Rainwater has the 
potential to be an important source of water for the country if adequately captured and 
stored.  
Especially in the South, water stress began to increase after the unification of the 
country in 1990. The southern region’s increase in the export of oil caused many farmers 
to stop using rainwater-based irrigation and made it easier for them to pump the water from 
groundwater sources due to the decreasing price of fuel.165 Less than 60% of the urban 
population and only one-third of the rural population had access to water infrastructure 
provided by the government.166 This led the remaining inhabitants to rely on water which 
was gathered with no government regulations in place, causing the Yemenis to pay very 
high prices for the important resource. In addition, water trucks have created a business 
opportunity of its own; people who own the trucks are able to drive around the countryside 
providing water at prices they deem fair without any regulation.167 With an already very 
limited budget, many families were pushed further into poverty due to water stress. 
Water did not cause war in Yemen during the years leading to the civil war in 2015. 
Water has not been the direct cause of war in any part of the world, but it may lead to 
friction in relationships between people who have access to water and people who do 
not.168 The relationship with the government and the people of Yemen strained when 
adequate water supplies could not be established. Herzberg establishes that several factors 
can transform water competition in a region: “predictability of flow, number of users, 
visibility, ‘symmetry of cause and effect’, power relations, and external interference.”169 
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Conflict arose over who would lead the country but there was no documentation of fights 
due to the lack of water infrastructure. More on this topic will be covered in the following 
section, which discusses conditions after the civil war began.  
After the Republic of Yemen (ROY) was created in 1990, water management 
attempts began. The National Water Resources Authority was created in 1995 with little 
jurisdiction or resources to actually stem the use of groundwater in order for future 
generations to have a water source.170 Not all areas of Yemen utilized the authority but in 
2002 the Water Law was established to curb the creation of private wells and water drilling 
pumps.171 Due to the lack of authority and resources required to account for all illegally 
drilled wells, this law was more a show of force than a success story for water usage in the 
country.172 This reiterates the importance in having buy-in among communities to make 
changes. The government offered a first step but when they could not fund the ability to 
investigate every well in the country, they fell short of their desired goal.  
2. Sources of Famine 
Famine begins due to different sources. Multiple types of crops are routinely grown 
throughout the Western part of Yemen in the mountainous landscape because the wadis 
allow for the collection of rainwater to assist in watering the fields.173 Main crops in the 
Abyan Delta, “the south central portion of the country,” and Sa’dah plains, “the north 
central part of Yemen,” consist of a variety of fruits, vegetables and wheats.174 In the 
eastern portion of the country, farming is completely unsustainable due to the inconsistency 
of oases and fertile land to grow crops.175 The Yemenis main subsistence crops are 
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sorghum, millet, wheat, and maize.176 Cash crops can be grown only if there is enough 
water leftover after attempting to grow the main and subsistence crops. The cash crops 
usually consist of cotton, sesame, and qat.177 The most water intensive crops in the world 
are cotton with a requirement of 7,000 to 29,000 liters of water per kilogram of crop and 
wheat with 900 liters of water per kilogram of crop required.178 The best drought resistant 
crops in the region are grapes, qat, and sorghum.179 In truth, cultivating agriculture for 
export and import use is difficult to do in a region of the world with such small rainfall 
amounts throughout the year that even subsistence agriculture cannot be successful without 
intricate irrigation methods.180 With ever decreasing sources of water and the inability to 
retain large swaths of rainwater, crop cultivation is a difficult endeavor for Yemenis. 
One major hindrance of crop cultivation has been the inadequacy of the government 
to effectively moderate irrigation techniques. Due to the arid climate, those who were at 
the top of the stream on the spate irrigation system attempted to use as much water as they 
could in order to develop their own fields.181 Although this was profitable for their needs, 
the people who lived downstream were unable to properly water their lands and yield a 
profitable crop. The people downstream were forced to search for water under ground or 
move due to the predicament.182 A model that Yemenis could follow in order to grow the 
best crops is desperately needed, one in which an organization helps the community decide 
where and when the appropriate crops should be grown and how much water is required 
for each level of the irrigation system in order to most effectively use their water and land 
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sources.183 Due to the ongoing conflict, this system has not been put in place and crops are 
consistently grown with water use being an afterthought. 
Floods of biblical proportions have caused massive destruction of crops, livestock, 
and infrastructure. Although climate change has caused many areas of Yemen to receive 
less water and further the desertification process, many seasons experience catastrophic 
flooding from Marib in the center of the country towards Al-Hudaydah in the West.184 
Flooding of these areas may sound like a good thing for a country in dire need of water. 
However, these massive floods usually do not replenish groundwater reserves.185 In order 
to retain this flood of water, dams and storage tanks are needed but due to five years of 
conflict, many of these facilities are not in place.  
World events have a major effect on food resources. Prior to the Arab Spring, the 
world experienced a global financial meltdown in 2008. After this occurred, the demand 
for agricultural goods dropped drastically and caused food prices to drop.186 By the time 
prices returned to normal, many of the farmers who were previously employed no longer 
had the means to grow crops and make the profits that they had made before.187 A major 
oil pipeline was disrupted in 2013 leading to higher fuel prices which in turn caused food 
prices to skyrocket.188 While people were unable to purchase food for their families, their 
poor literacy rates inhibited their full grasp of the problem and understanding of the 
necessary requirements to course correct.189 At the beginning of the war, not only was 
there a food shortage but there was a lack of people willing or able to farm the available 
lands to provide the necessary foods to the nation. 
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3. Migration Patterns 
Throughout the history of Yemen, people have flowed in and out of the country. In 
the 1960s and 70s, Yemenis from the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in 
the South and Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) in the North migrated to Africa and Saudi 
Arabia in order to escape military provocations.190 After artificial irrigation was 
introduced in the 1970s in the Sa’dah basin of the North, many Yemenis moved to the area 
to prosper from the agricultural boom.191 Then, in the 1990s, immigrants flooded into 
Yemen when the Republic of Yemen (ROY) was established, in hopes of finding new jobs 
and opportunities for their families.192 Over the next decade, the economic outlook 
appeared grim for these immigrants and migration slowed up until 2011.193 Migration can 
contribute to environmental insecurities like famine and water scarcity if the region is 
unable to provide resources and jobs for the newcomers. 
The ability to find a job and provide for families is imperative for immigrants. In 
Yemen, average per capita income hovered around 20% of the world’s average in the early 
2010s.194 This means that as migrants entered the country, more and more were unable to 
find work. When people are in need of work, then their ability to purchase necessities is 
deeply affected. Quality and health standards are not usually considered so the risk of 
becoming an environmental refugee increases.195 The probability of utilizing a poor water 
source or becoming overly dependent on a particular authority, either a friendly NGO or a 
hazardous rebel group, increases.  
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Climate change plays a role on migration. As rain patterns change for a farmer, they 
have three options: keep in their present location and act like nothing is happening, keep 
in their location and do their best to change their fate, or pack up their belongings and move 
to a different environment.196 Yemeni farmers faced similar predicaments. People in the 
Horn of Africa across the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea also faced similar issues. Many moved 
into regions now controlled by the numerous controlling factions in Yemen. Conflict can 
be spurred by climate change-induced migration.197 The speed of migration into a 
particular city or area has been proven to determine the intensity and likelihood of creating 
a conflict; thus, in Yemen, due to the increase over several years conflict was 
predictable.198 
B. ENVIRONMENTAL STRESSES FACED DURING CIVIL WAR 
Operation Decisive Storm began 26 March 2015 when the Hadi government 
pleaded for help from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council states to assist in 
stopping the Houthi movement and Saleh from taking over.199 By 21 April, the Saudi 
government transitioned Operation Decisive Storm into Operation Restoring Hope; 
however, this operation did not truly restore hope and instead continued the brutal attacks 
from Operation Decisive Storm.200 In the North, Yemen confronted a Shia-led uprising 
while in the South, an Al-Qaeda-led conflict was brewing.201 This section will explore 
how water scarcity, famine, and migration increased during the course of the war and added 
to the complexities of the ongoing conflict. Water can cause a cascade of other 
environmental insecurities. The water insecurity section will explain how diseases can 
spread quickly and with dire consequences for the population. 
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1. Present Water Security Issues 
Yemen has been left in a situation with very few avenues for an adequate supply of 
water. Although many aid organizations and foreign entities bring water in via trucks and 
bottles, many donors have been reluctant to provide aid prior to the outbreak of civil war 
due to the overwhelming security concerns that plagued the country making it difficult for 
distribution of this precious resource.202 It is undisputed that Yemen was affected by a lack 
of water long before the conflict began. Water scarcity grew worse as time and fighting 
persisted. Water insecurity existed before the war, was exacerbated during the war, and has 
been used as a tool in the war. Yemen’s water crisis is similar to the Syrian refugees in 
Jordan and Lebanon as explained by Baylouny and Klingseis.203 Yemenis need water to 
create food. Groundwater supply is low, there are too many water pumps extracting water, 
and the irrigation systems in use are inefficient.  
A recent way to negatively affect the ability of civilians to access Yemen’s limited 
water supply has been to limit the flow of oil through Yemeni ports. This process has been 
undertaken by Saudi Arabia.204 In recent months, many ships have had to stay out to sea 
for greater than 50 days before entering the port of Al Hodeidah, a Houthi stronghold.205 
Fuel provides both the ability of farmers to pump groundwater to water their crops and 
normal citizens to obtain drinking water.206 By preventing fuel from reaching the citizens 
who desperately need it, these citizens are forced to find water from regions in the South 
at exorbitant prices. In addition, the vehicles, farming equipment, and water pumps that 
require fuel to run are no longer providing them the food and water they need to farm and 
live. This creates a snowball effect in which people will become more desperate for water 
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and risk consuming unsafe water that may result in cholera or other stomach-borne 
illnesses, increasing their suffering exponentially. 
The targeting of water facilities added to the water scarcity in Yemen. The coalition 
forces have disrupted water supply to citizens of Yemen.207 This is interesting because in 
previous Middle Eastern conflicts, rebel forces were usually the ones targeting water 
supplies.208 The reason for this may be the Houthis understanding of Islam and how they 
are sworn to protect the lives that happen to be living amongst their strongholds. Saudi air 
forces managed to target civilian infrastructure, either directly or through strategic 
mistakes, by hitting water stations and electric grids in order to coerce the people living 
under Houthi territories to realize that living conditions would be untenable if they stayed 
with the rebels.209 Yemen’s only working desalination plant in Taizz was targeted in 2016 
and completely destroyed.210 The perpetrator of the attack is unknown but due to Houthi 
videos on the scene, it appears the attack was carried out by Saudi Arabia in order to force 
the Yemenis from the area and to stop supporting the Houthis. The result of these types of 
attacks have not paved a way for Yemenis under Houthi rule to turn against them. However, 
some researchers show that after targeting these types of structures, it takes a long time to 
fully understand if the actions were effective in terms of military strategy.211 The attacks 
were effective on destroying critical infrastructure. Attacks on water infrastructure occur 
during war but their effectiveness is not clearly known. In this case, these types of attacks 
appear to exacerbate the ongoing war by causing more and more Yemenis to suffer. 
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The civil war in Yemen did not start over water. However, it is possible for water 
wars to develop from water scarcity, existing conflict, and public statements from leaders 
that create chaos.212 There is precedent for the weaponization of water to inflict political 
instability and violence as seen in Syria and Iraq.213 By taking control of a water source, 
the person or group that controls it, especially in a water-scarce area, can exhibit a high 
level of leverage over the population who remains under their control. Water is a powerful 
tool. The threat of ISIS using water against the inhabitants of Syria and Iraq was one of the 
top factors for U.S. re-engagement in the region.214 The idea that Houthi rebels and the 
Yemen government can do this with existing water resources is not unfathomable. 
Water-borne diseases like cholera spread rapidly across the country during the civil 
war. Cholera is spread by many factors but researchers attribute it mainly to a lack of water 
infrastructure and access to clean water facilities either for use in bathrooms or for 
drinking.215 Although cholera spread rampantly before the war, there was a sharp uptick 
in cases due to the forced movement of people into urban areas where education on how to 
avoid getting cholera was not in place.216 This triggered a massive outbreak in Yemen that 
added to the complexity of the ongoing civil war. 
Fuel plays a major role in the ability of cholera to spread. By limiting fuel supply 
through ports, people are unable to power their water pumps to gain access to water. When 
access to those water sources is unavailable, the price of water increases 50% in highly 
populated cities like Hajjah and Al-Hodeidah.217 People use unclean sources of water 
which may lead to acute watery diarrhea (AWD) or cholera.218 When they turn to these 
unclean water sources, they are dependent on the government to provide them water. 
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However, the government is not available to provide clean water, or fuel for that matter, in 
order to keep their citizens healthy.  
Cholera is curable and requires a vaccine to stop its spread. During the outbreak in 
2018, the government did not have access to oral cholera vaccines.219 The government 
approached humanitarian organizations for aid when they realized they could do nothing 
to curb the spread of the water-borne disease. Many human rights watchdogs accused the 
illegal targeting of water wells, bottling facilities, and water treatment plants as the direct 
source of cholera outbreaks.220 Unfortunately, the humanitarian organizations were low 
on the stockpile of these types of vaccines and could not supply them fast enough to stop 
the spread.221 Had there been proper water infrastructure or education on cholera, this issue 
could have been avoided.222 It appears a contributing factor to the number of deaths was 
the lack of medical supplies that could have treated many of those who contracted the 
illness.  
2. Migration issues 
One would assume that if there is war in a territory, many people would head the 
other way. However, this has not proven true for Yemen. Migration would not necessarily 
be thought of as an issue for a country experiencing a civil war. Since the beginning of the 
conflict, 138,000 people have both migrated from the Horn of Africa and returned to 
Yemen on their way to Saudi Arabia.223 They have some sort of knowledge of the ongoing 
crisis but many believe it is more important to enter the country where their loved ones are 
remaining. Migration is a second order effect of the ongoing conflict. Due to the 
combination of climate change, water scarcity, famine, and war, people are moving around 
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the country.224 Often, they are heading to areas where basic necessities are suspected to 
exist: cities and urban centers. Migration has not been analyzed as much as water, famine, 
and diseases in relation to the conflict. Naturally, war causes the destruction of homes and 
livelihoods, causing people to seek refuge in an area where life can be sustained. In Yemen, 
people do not have the luxury of leaving the country and therefore become internally 
displaced persons (IDPs).225 
Once an individual migrates into Yemen, they cannot leave due to the ongoing 
crisis and COVID-19 protocols in the surrounding countries. Internally, Yemen faces an 
IDP crisis that remains the fourth highest in the world with over four million people 
affected.226 Migration patterns existed before the war and exponentially increased during 
the war. This environmental insecurity has been exacerbated due to the conflict, but it is 
difficult to ascertain whether migration is being used as a tool of the war. There is no proof 
that Houthi rebels or government forces are using migration in their favor. From an outside 
perspective, it appears migration could be beneficial for either side depending on where 
the individual chooses to travel to from their destroyed home. 
Migration and the movement of people throughout Yemen has increased the spread 
of COVID-19 in the country. Numbers of positive cases in the North under Houthi control 
have gone unreported while facilities in the South continue to experience high death rates 
of 21% due to the lack of capable facilities and human resources to fight the virus.227 
Yemen will receive 1.9 million doses of AstraZeneca, a drop in the bucket for the 27 
million people living within its borders.228 The war caused many people to leave their 
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houses and join others in crowded urban dwellings allowing the virus to feed on a very 
vulnerable population on top of all other insecurity issues. 
3. Famine Issues 
At the beginning of the conflict, nearly 90% of the population in Yemen depended 
on food imports for basic food supplies, including grain.229 Famine did not contribute to 
the start of the civil war but it has definitely worsened conditions on the ground. Without 
water, it is difficult to grow food. The country is heavily dependent on imports, yet the 
Saudis continually block shipments of food to the territory controlled by the Houthis. The 
Saudi-led coalition is not just targeting agriculture in the fields but also the direct supply 
and shipment of food into the country.230 If the people living under the Houthis are not 
allowed to eat, they will die of starvation. 
If a country cannot create enough food for their inhabitants, food must be imported 
in. Or, if the country happens to be a rich country, like Qatar, a food embargo can create 
industry within the borders of a country and spur competition throughout the region.231 
During the Yemen conflict, food has had a difficult time reaching people under Houthi 
control in the North. During Operations Decisive Storm and Restoring Hope, Saudi Arabia 
targeted the port of Hodeidah and one of the most traveled roads in the area with multiple 
air strikes.232 This effectively cut off the import of food to Yemenis living under Houthi 
control, causing malnutrition and famine to increase exponentially. In sum, the people in 
this area were now succumbing to a blockade on their port, destruction of their 
transportation system to acquire goods, air strikes on their infrastructure, and a complete 
lack of government to assist in gaining access to food.  
As with water, fuel plays a major role in affecting the Yemenis’ ability to obtain 
food. The delay in shipments of fuel at ports cause catastrophic events for Yemenis. In the 
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case of the recent delay in fuel shipments at port Hodeidah, when fuel does not reach the 
shore, then transportation of goods throughout the country stops, fuel prices dramatically 
increase, food prices escalate and famine revels in the chaos.233 The sabotage of fuel by 
Saudi Arabia directly affects the ongoing famine. 
Technologies to advance farming techniques and smart use of water require 
education and money that many Yemenis do not have. This creates an area for exploitation 
by outside influences. For instance, because technology is limited to those who have the 
ability to afford it, a patronage system can be implemented in which Yemeni farmers are 
exploited and caused to owe large debts to the people or countries who come in to show 
them new ways.234 Therefore, foreign countries and organizations can control which areas 
receive assistance and are able to create better living conditions for themselves during times 
of drought for their crops. 
Sometimes forces who control the land unknowingly alleviate the harm caused by 
climate and water scarcity. The AQAP, due to their religious rules, have outlawed qat in 
the areas they hold under their control.235 It is unclear if they are aware of the benefits of 
this law on their people. The plant is addictive habitually chewed by men and women all 
over the country in order to give them a high.236 In regard to agriculture and sustainability, 
Qat is a super water intensive crop and actually assists in alleviating the ongoing water 
crisis while allowing other less water intensive plants to be developed and grown. In 
addition, when qat is used as frequently as it is in Yemen, the users typically do little else 
and allow problems like water insecurity, food scarcity, and lack of electricity to persist.237 
Accidental measures like this ease the effect on water scarcity slightly but do not assist in 
decreasing famine. 
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C. CONCLUSION 
The informative conclusion is determined that the environmental issues outlined in 
the previous sections are not prolonging or intensifying the conflict itself. At least, there is 
not enough evidence to effectively convey this argument. Environmental issues did not 
cause the war in Yemen. However, environmental insecurity problems continued to 
deteriorate as a result of the conflict. The environmental insecurities occurred through 
numerous channels. The existing water collection and food procurement practices were 
interrupted by the conflict due to the outbreak of violence and internal migration. Aid 
organizations were restricted in their ability to help when needed due to the conflict itself 
and issues outside of Yemen like supply-chain problems. Water sources were and continue 
to be deliberately targeted during the conflict, exacerbating the water scarcity issues. 
Finally, with the recent Saudi-led blockade on fuel imports and exports, obtaining water 
and food continues to be a struggle for the population. As a result, human insecurity has 
increased substantially within the confines of Yemen. 
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IV. OUTCOME 
Yemen faces multiple crises. The history of Yemen shows that there have been 
multiple periods of strife within its borders. The lack of adequate amounts of water and 
education on proper agricultural techniques have shaped how the country has fallen into 
multiple environmental security crises. However, these are not the only reasons for the 
catastrophes facing the population. The leadership in charge of the multiple governments 
since 1962 did not do everything in their power to help Yemenis build a sustainable 
environment to live in. Yemenis became disillusioned with the lack of solutions to solve 
their environmental insecurity problems. The ongoing civil war has yet to end, further 
exacerbating the people’s plight. 
This chapter summarizes the thesis’s findings with answers to its central questions, 
about whether and how environmental insecurities in Yemen contributed to its more recent 
conflict. In order to understand these relationships, the thesis explores a deep dive into 
Yemen’s history, focusing on government officials’ failure to counter environmental 
insecurities. Findings demonstrated that Yemen’s complex history helps explain why these 
environmental insecurities went largely unnoticed by outside eyes until the outbreak of 
civil war in 2015. The chapter also highlights several notable discoveries about the civil 
war that were made during the research process. It concludes with policy recommendations 
and suggestions for future research.  
This thesis suggests that environmental insecurities were not the cause of the 
current civil war, but that the country has experienced worsening environmental 
insecurities during the conflict partly caused by the civil war. As in other contested areas 
in the Middle East, it is possible to interpret episodes of withholding water and food from 
the population as a weapon of war. The lack of primary sources and the denial by forces to 
bluntly say environmental resources were targeted outright makes it difficult to ascertain 
whether some of the actions thus far were accidental or intently made. The next section 
will expand on the overall findings of the research. 
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A. RESEARCH GOALS AND FINDINGS 
Water, food, and proper living conditions are essential to life anywhere on this 
planet. Yemen is no exception. Environmental insecurities, including water and food 
shortages, have played a major role in the history of Yemen since 1962. They continue to 
play a major role today. As one observer of the situation in Yemen stated in 2020, the civil 
war was “aggravated by escalating conflict, the COVID-19 pandemic, disease outbreaks, 
torrential rains and flooding, a desert locust plague, economic collapse, a fuel crisis across 
northern governorates, and reduced humanitarian aid.”238 This section summarizes the 
thesis’ answers for the four questions that drove and organized this research into 
relationships.  
1. Did Environmental Insecurity Predate the Civil War? 
Water scarcity, famine, water-borne diseases, and migration existed before the civil 
war broke out in 2015. These issues arose due to climate change, lack of knowledge and 
regulation regarding water-preserving farming techniques, and a growing population in a 
region where ground water is not prevalent. The issues have been documented since the 
country’s independence in 1962. As previously discussed in chapter 3, water insecurity 
accelerated when farmers took advantage of low fuel prices to increase the volume of wells 
dug in the farmlands. The government could not keep up nor could they effectively regulate 
the number of wells created. Farmers were looking to make a profit and there was no way 
to do this without using water. Famine and food supply issues were driven not only by 
climate change but the lack of education in scarce water farming techniques. Farmers chose 
to grow cash-crops vice crops that required lower amounts of water because they needed 
to turn a profit in order to support their families. There were few government officials 
telling them which crops to grow and how to create a more sustainable agriculture system 
on Yemeni lands. Migration was also widespread over the tumultuous history of the Yemen 
Arab Republic (YAR) in the North and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen 
(PDRY) in the South. Additionally, diseases were prevalent due to water scarcity issues, 
famine, and close living-quarters in urban environments prior to the war.  
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2. Did Environmental Insecurities Cause the Civil War? 
These issues did not directly cause the outbreak of the civil war. Rather, one can 
point to the Arab Spring and lack of effective governance providing access to basic 
necessities as the culprits. Additional driving forces behind the war appeared to be different 
political beliefs and a large group of people becoming dissatisfied with the leadership of 
the country and their inability to provide main essentials for life. Environmental 
insecurities could therefore be seen as making second or third order contributions to the 
war’s onset, but they were not the primary causes. 
Although the issue of environmental insecurities has lasted for decades, the root of 
the conflict spurring this recent war comes from intense displeasure between the Zaydis 
and the Sunni government that allowed for intensifying displays of hatred to occur between 
them.239 The speculation that environmental insecurities caused this war appear to be 
untrue. In addition, the Houthis do not want to control the government; they want a greater 
say in how the government works and a desire in the ability to help shape the new 
government with inputs from their ideological views.240 
3. Did Environmental Insecurities Intensify the Civil War? 
Environmental insecurities worsened the effect of the civil war. The insecurities 
that began long before the conflict started only grew in size after 2015. Due to Yemen’s 
climate and lack of water infrastructure prior to the conflict, the country was destined to 
experience environmental insecurity issues on this scale. The civil war permitted the 
suffering of the people to be popularized in the media and the general public became 
acutely aware of Yemeni problems. The civil war is still ongoing, thus, discovering an 
exact quantifiable figure to determine the difference between the environmental 
insecurities before and after the war is unattainable. As discussed in chapter 3, the 
insecurities added to the conflict and brought the attention of the world due to some of the 
atrocities committed by coalition forces. 
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4. Did the Civil War Intensify Environmental Insecurities? 
The civil war did intensify environmental insecurities. Water scarcity likely 
increased as the war continued. This was due to Saudi Arabia and coalition forces targeted 
destruction of water desalination plants, trucks carrying water, and water purification plants 
in the region. However, it is difficult to assess how much these operations reduced water 
supplies, since water was already a scarce commodity prior to the war and reliable data 
points are unavailable.  
For food insecurity, a similar logic applies. There is not conclusive evidence to 
show that the civil war independently provoked famine. Famine and food insecurity existed 
prior to the war due to poor farming practices and climate change. However, blockades of 
ships heading to Houthi-held ports may have intensified food security and accelerated 
famine. These blockades increased the crisis on the ground by preventing the movement of 
fuel, food, and aid into the region. Yet, these shortages also predated the war, so it is 
difficult to argue with certainty that they are by-products. 
Migration was also prevalent prior to the advent of the war. During the war, 
migration patterns have displayed interesting fluctuations. In the beginning, people flocked 
to urban centers, causing a massive increase in demand on city facilities like water, fuel, 
food, and employment. At the same time, people continued to migrate into the country 
from the Horn of Africa in order to make their way to other countries in the Middle East. 
But, as the conflict continued, the borders that those migrants crossed began to close. In 
addition, due to COVID-19, the borders were obstructed. This caused many people to be 
stuck in Yemen without the ability to obtain adequate employment or housing. Water, food, 
and fuel supplies ran low in areas with severe overcrowding. In the past year, migration to 
Yemen has slowed and people are realizing they need to leave in order to survive. The net 
migration number in Yemen is negative.241 Migration began before the war and was likely 
to continue, with or without it. 
 
241 “Net Migration Rate.” 
57 
A controlling factor in the civil war is the ability to obtain fuel. Whoever controls 
the port of Hodeidah controls the well-being of millions of Yemenis due to it being a major 
port of entry for fuel. Bombs and bullets are destructive in their own right, but in Yemen, 
fuel, or the lack thereof, damages every critical system. Without fuel, there is no food 
because the ability to move it from town to town is removed. Without fuel, there is no water 
because many Yemenis rely on water pumps, which are powered by fuel. The ability to get 
water from place to place is aggravated by the loss of transportation due to the loss of fuel. 
Fuel is a critical component to living conditions in Yemen. 
Evaluating whether these issues of food insecurity, water scarcity, and migration 
should be understood or viewed as a by-product of the civil war proved to be extremely 
difficult, primarily due to data limitations. It will be impossible to overcome these 
limitations before the war ends and the country can be safely accessed. Then, if the 
environmental insecurities were to increase in size and scope, it might be concluded that 
they were not by-products of the war. However, if the environmental insecurities were to 
decrease in size and scope, then it might be concluded that they were a by-product of the 
war. This could be a research question explored for a future thesis. Obtaining data on the 
size and scope of environmental insecurities would be crucial in finding the answer. Data 
must be obtained from the ground and at this point in the conflict, there does not appear to 
be a path forward for this data to be gathered. 
5. Were Environmental Resources Used as a Tool in the Civil War? 
There are isolated incidents where some pundits may claim that environmental 
insecurity issues were used as a tool by parties involved in the civil war. However, from 
the research outlined in previous chapters, these narratives are unclear. The incidents show 
that water facilities and the country’s only desalination plant were targeted. However, this 
does not prove that the culprits of the attacks had the intent to use an environmental 
insecurity like water scarcity as a tool to further their siege. No government explicitly stated 
the destruction of water facilities was targeted. It would seem like a logical tactic in the 
long run and maybe this hasn’t been seen or reported thoroughly. A rebel group or an 
established government could attack water sources or food supply buildings with dual 
58 
purposes. First, they would destroy the facilities and then they themselves would provide 
the resources to show the population that they could provide for their basic needs. This 
type of action seems like a costly endeavor for a country and/or movement that does not 
have enough resources to begin with.  
Thus, for the Zaydis or Saudis to use environmental insecurities as a tool to win the 
war appears to be illogical. It would be difficult to prove that the KSA or other forces are 
deliberately targeting environmental insecurities in order to further inflict pain on the 
country because there is a lack of documentation on the subject. Once more is written about 
the conflict, this may in fact turn out to be true. For the time being, destroying resources 
for the people who live under the rule of the Hadi government or the rebel forces would 
not appear to prove beneficial to their cause.  
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The final section concludes the thesis with recommendations on how to solve the 
environmental insecurities in Yemen. Several immediate actions must take place to 
improve the lives of impoverished Yemenis. Then, the war must end with diplomatic 
resolutions in place to ensure Yemen does not fall into the chaos that the country has 
endured for the past six years. Finally, a recovery effort should be in place to enhance 
Yemen’s economic position. By uncovering resources like fishing and tourism, the 
Yemenis could reduce their reliance on subsistence farming and ease the pressure on 
currently available water sources. Resolving Yemen’s environmental insecurities may aid 
in ending the war but because this recent war did not directly begin because of existing 
environmental insecurities, this tactic may not be effective. 
1. Immediate Actions 
A major problem plaguing Yemen in the context of the conflict consists of the 
accidental targeting of civilian infrastructure. International laws need to do a better job 
protecting water systems and ensuring that militaries identify legitimate targets that will 
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not affect the ability of civilians to access WASH facilities.242 WASH infrastructure must 
be at the forefront of whichever power assumes responsibility for Yemen in the future. 
Foreign aid will prove to be a problem in the coming months due to the economic 
toll of the coronavirus on the world in 2020 and 2021. This year, Yemen received billions 
of dollars less in foreign aid than in previous years due to fall in most of the world’s 
economies.243 Less aid means less water, food, seeds, fuel, electricity, healthcare, and 
housing will be available to Yemenis who are in need. Money that has previously been 
present to provide for critical infrastructure systems may not be available as often. The toll 
of the coronavirus on Yemeni people will take years to fully understand. 
NGOs and foreign governments are stepping in to provide better ways to manage 
water with Yemen. Early in July, the Netherlands partnered with the Food and Agriculture 
Organization to begin training farmers and provide them with technologies to better assist 
in cultivating crops while at the same time saving water.244 These organizations realize 
that even though the war has not ended, there are still items that can be accomplished to 
develop a more sustainable environment in Yemen. At the very least, these actions will 
show Yemenis that the rest of the world has not forgotten about them. 
The U.S. and the world should do more to assist the Yemenis. While some argue 
that the U.S. needs to pull out of the Middle East, Stephen Cook argues the time is now to 
establish and preserve stability, especially in a country as war-torn as Yemen.245 Naming 
the Houthis a Foreign Terrorist Organization proved that the legal framework of this 
designation would be far too damaging to the people forced under their control.246 The 
designation should be removed in order to allow aid organizations to support the millions 
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of people who are in dire need of food, water, and medical supplies to survive. By giving 
them this designation, the U.S. is disenfranchising a group of people who have no way to 
change their current situation. This is inhumane and unacceptable behavior that cannot be 
overlooked by Western countries. 
2. Ending the War 
Before more aggressive and expensive options are to be implemented, the civil war 
needs to end. To address the inadequacies of the current infrastructures supplying food, 
water, and electricity, fighting must end. Those systems cannot be rebuilt and reinvigorated 
until the violence stops. It would be impossible to invest in infrastructure projects that may 
be targeted by forces vying for power in the country. Desalination plants are expensive. 
Since the only one in Yemen was destroyed and taken off-line, no one is willing to risk 
their own money to rebuild until the developer can be assured fighting will not destroy it 
again. The country needs a government that will provide the means to guarantee basic 
WASH necessities. During a war, no one has time to learn new agricultural practices or 
safe means of cleaning potentially unsanitary water. These are just some of a few reasons 
why the conflict must end before the environmental insecurities can be addressed. 
The United States and other Western countries have a role to play in ending the 
conflict because they are complicit in this war due to the overwhelming number of Western 
weapons that have ended up on the ground in Yemen.247 These countries also have an 
incentive to intervene because it is possible that if the civil war does not end and the 
environmental insecurities continue to grow, we could witness a mass extinction and/or 
migration event in the country. As Baylouny and Klingseis forewarned in Jordan and 
Lebanon with regards to Syrian refugees, “the refugees did not create water scarcity, but 
they did exacerbate it, advancing the timeline for water deprivation.”248 So far, Yemenis’ 
wartime migration and refugee patterns have not matched those of countries like Syria, 
Iraq, and Libya, since Yemenis have fewer options to safely move outside the country due 
to its geographic location. However, if more people attempt to cross the Bab al-Mandeb in 
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order to find refuge in Somalia, Djibouti, or Eritrea, this could intensify insecurity in those 
countries.249  
3. Yemen’s Post-War Recovery 
Saudi Arabia invested in the world’s most expensive desalinization plant, Ras al-
Khair, and plans to build an additional one in the future.250 If Saudi Arabia and coalition 
forces retain the ability to mold Yemen post-civil war, then the avenue for investment in 
the highly expensive desalination process could be developed by them, too. However, a 
desalination plant will be ineffective for regions of Yemen at higher elevations due to the 
expense of pumping water to those altitudes; this would only be a solution for coastal 
cities.251 Lack of water is one of the many reasons why Yemen is struggling to provide 
basic necessities for its people. 
The government in place prior to the war does not hold all the blame for the current 
water crisis. Officials could have done more to create a better water infrastructure plan for 
its people. A popular argument surfacing is that although having a government in place to 
incorporate infrastructure for the benefit of its citizens is crucial, there must also be a will 
and desire by the people to collectively have this infrastructure in place.252 This is valid in 
pre-war Yemen but another dimension is added when the war is considered a factor. Not 
only does the government and the will of the people need to be considered, but 
extraordinary events such as civil war need to be taken into account. The forces that retain 
power in a region — not just official government authority — have the ability to shape 
infrastructure.253 The patronage system in concert with the broken governments and rebels 
in control of different segments of the country rely on the chaos that ensues in order to keep 
the conflict stirring so there is no need for a build-up of infrastructure systems like water 
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and sanitation.254 In this case, the chaos is the civil war that is being fought by all sides: 
the Hadi government, the Houthi rebels, the Southern Separatists, and the AQAP. 
Continuing to fail to invest in adequate infrastructure prolongs the conflict and allows for 
all sides to point the proverbial finger at one another. 
Yemen does not need to depend on agriculture to create a successful economy. 
Fisheries and ports in Yemen could be exploited to build wealth within its borders. Foreign 
interference does not always lead to a successful new beginning for countries in the Middle 
East. Yemen is located in a prime location for fishing. Exploring the local fish available 
for consumption and possibly as an export could be beneficial for the Yemeni. Foreign 
countries are fishing at high rates off the coast of Yemen making great gains in the global 
fishing market while Yemen does not profit from this commodity.255 As one of the 
environmental insecurity issues of the world that does not get much coverage, a future 
thesis should explore how Yemen could become one of the world’s leading fishing 
exporters. They have the ports to build the infrastructure required. There are many 
obstacles to get there but developing a fishing economy could help create employment 
opportunities for farmers who are in need of work and it could alleviate the amount of 
pressure on existing water supplies. 
There will be no Yemen if water cannot be provided for people to live and prosper. 
There will be no Yemen if an effective electrical grid is not created for businesses to work 
and internet to be used. There will be no Yemen if people cannot find or grow food to 
provide for themselves and their families. There will be no Yemen if migration continues 
to increase not only from rural farmlands into the cities but from foreign countries in Africa 
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